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1. Introduction
The corporate governance Systems in the U.K. and in Germany differ
markedly. German large firms have a two-board structure, they are subject  to
employee codetermination, their managements are not confronted with public
hostile takeover bids, and banks play a major role in corporate governance,
through equity stakes, through proxies given to them by small investors, and
through bankers’ positions on the supervisory boards of these firms. One of
the main issues of corporate governance in large firms, the Problem  of
shareholders’ passivity in monitoring management in Berle-Means type
corporations, is thus addressed by an institutional Provision, the role of the
banks, rather than by a market-oriented Solution as we find it in the U.K. with
its “market for corporate control” through the threat of hostile takeovers.
These two different approaches to corporate governance have been
compared several times recently, and it was argued that a bank-based or
institutional Solution has clear advantages and should be preferred. Cosh,
Hughes and Singh,’ for example, argue at the conclusion of their discussion
of takeovers and short-termism in the U.K. that
“the institutional shareholder [in the UK] should take a much
more active and vigorous part in the internal governance of
corporations. . . . In Order for such a proposal to be effective
both in disciplining inefficient managements and promoting
long-term investments, far reaching changes in the internal
workings and behaviour of the financial institutions would be
required. The financial institutions would need to pool their
resources together, set up specialised departments for
promoting investment and innovations - in other words
behave like German banks.”
The following remarks seek to continue this discussion from the German
perspective. The article will first attempt to evaluate the monitoring potential of
our domestic bank or institution-oriented corporate governance System and
then, in a further patt, compare it with that of a market-oriented Solution. lt will
be argued that both Systems focus on different Problems and have specific
advantages and drawbacks, and that there are still quite a few puzzles to be
solved until all pros and cons of each of these monitoring devices tan be
assessed. The perception  that both Systems focus on different Problems
suggests combining institutional monitoring with a “market for corporate2
control” rather than considering them to be contrasting and incompatible
approaches.
The article is organized as follows. Section II will describe the legal structure
of the large corporation in Germany in more detail. Section Ill explains why a
“market for corporate control” by the threat of public hostile takeover bids
does not exist in Germany. Section IV then Shows  how corporate governance
in publicly held corporations with small investors is organized instead, and
deals with the role of banks in corporate governance in these firms. Section V
of the atticle then will try to compare the monitoring potential of a market-
oriented and our bank or institution-oriented corporate governance System.
Concluding remarks follow.
II. The Structure of the Large Corporation
1. Legal forms of firms and distribution of ownership
In Germany firms tan be organized and run either by a sole proprietor, a
partnership2 or by a corporation. The most important forms of corporations
are the private Company with limited liabili$  and the stock corporation.4 The
following remarks will only deal with the publicly held stock corporations, the
stock of which is either owned by scattered individuals or by institutions. While
only focussing on these publicly owned corporations we have to keep in mind
that although we are speaking of a small number of firms, they are also
Germany’s largest firms: In 1990 there were about 2 million firms in Germany;
of these about 430,000 were private companies with limited liability and less
than 2,700 were stock corporations.5 Of the latter only 551 are quoted on a
stock exchange,6 and of these 551 about 80 are widely held and traded7
However, most of these corporations with widely distributed ownership are
among the 100 largest firms in Germany8.
2. The three “Organs” of the stock corporation
To understand corporate governance in these large stock corporations, the
impediments to hostile takeovers (cf. Section ill.) as well as the role of the3
banks in this respect (cf. Section IV.), it is necessary to mention some special
features of German corporate law.
First, the two-tier or dual boards System, which was established in 1870. lt
consists of a management board and a separate supervisory board.
Management is appointed, mostly for five year terms, and is dismissed by the
Supervisor-y  board.g The management runs the day-to-day business of the
firm independently and tan only be recalled for Cause. Complete power rests
with neither the management nor the supervisory board. A more detailled
picture would show a complex structure of balance of powers between these
two Organs. The powers of the shareholders’ meetings are restrained to basic
decisions such as changes of the Statutes, approval of the annual Statements
of accounts, distribution of (half of) the annual balance-sheet Profits, election
of (half the) members of the supervisory board, consent to some specific
structural changes as mergers, issuance of new stock and the like.
Second, the codetermination  systed” involves members of the supervisory
board that are neither elected nor appointed by the shareholders. In firms with
more than 2,000 employees, half of the members of the supervisory board are
elected by the shareholders and the other half by the employees (blue and
white collar as well as lower-ranking management) and labor Unions. Hence,
the members of the supervisory board and the management board are
considered to be agents of all stakeholders in the firm rather than of the
shareholders only. 1 1
Third, the voting process. There is no proxy System  with proxies for the
management. In the shareholder meetings shares are either voted by the
shareholders themselves or - in the case of smaller shareholdings - by
institutions, mainly banks, which act as custodians for the shares. This voting
power of a few banks, sometimes not more than three or four, each with a
large block of votes, gets their representatives on the supervisory boards
(alongside the representatives of the employees and trade Unions). This will
be described in more detail in Section IV.4
Ill. Impediments to Hostile Takeovers
1. Specific structural features of German corporate law
To date, no public hostile takeover bid has been successful in Germany. One
actual case is still pending - although a bid in its technical sense has not yet
been launched - the struggle between the two tyre makers Continental AG
and Pirelli of Italy. The attempt of the French Company AGF to take over the
insurer AMB has recently been settled by an agreement. What are the
reasons for this Pattern which obviously is so different from the Anglo-
American corporate world?
To Start with, these recent cases may indicate an ongoing Change which will
probably be reinforced by the further internationalisation  of markets and
changes of the economic and regulatory environment in the E.C. Apart from
that, the fact that public hostile takeovers did not occur until now does not
mean that there are no hostile takeovers at all. The management of Hoesch
AG, the shares of which were recently taken over by Krupp, would probably
have liked to hinder this shift of control if there had been a Chance to do so.
Resistance to a hostile takeover is not always possible, as will be shown later,
and will become particularly difficult for an incumbent management if it loses
the support of one or even several depot banks. That means that in such
cases these institutions will still play an important if not a decisive role, and
that means in turn that these cases cannot - in terms of our differentiation
between inside monitoring by institutions versus outside control by a takeover
market - be attributed clearly to the latter. Hence it is justified to exclude such
“private” hostile takeover activities which are accompanied or supported by
the depot institutions and focus on public hostile takeover bids only.
We need not speculate about different corporate cultures here to explain why
this technique to gain control even against the will of the incumbent
management is not used in corporate Germany so far. There are quite a few
more tangible and concrete arguments which explain this Pattern as a result
of specific structural features of German Company law as well as of the
conditions of corporate finance and other peculiarities. The following remarks
will try to describe some of these impediments to hostile takeovers in more
detail.5
aal First remember the comparably small number of potential targets:
There are less than 100 listed stock corporations with widely distributed
shares.l* The continued concentration of equity holdings in families or small
groups of shareholders tan to a large extent be explained by the relative
importante of debt (bank) rather than equity financing.13
As to the large corporations with widely distributed stock, the shares in these
firms are normally not voted by the shareholders themselves but by depot
banks as proxy holders. Hence these few large banks play a key role in this
respect. Until recently the majority of these banks firmly opposed public
hostile takeovers (“blunders of American capitalism”) and supported
managements in protecting firms and themselves against possible attempts
by amending the Statutes through antitakeover provisions. Is this attitude
likely to Change  if the banks’ competitors from abroad finance hostile takeover
bids in the future? Only if the benefits from supporting a hostile takeover bid
outweigh the disadvantages that our large banks still fear from their corporate
clientele if they were to support such an attack. In this context, it should be
mentioned that the Großbanken (large banks) themselves are also (or were at
least until recently, before the cross-holding alliance between Dresdner and
Allianz) large corporations with widely dispersed shareholders; hence, their
managements have no interest in being exposed to a hostile takeover, either.
On the other hand, the banks as depot institutions have been increasingly
criticised in the literature as well as in the media. Not least because of this
criticism two of the three Großbanken recently abstained from voting in the
Conti case where the issue was whether they, as the proxy holders of their
clients, were to abolish an antitakeover Provision in the company’s statute.
W A second structural impediment to hostile takeovers is the two-boards
structure. The representatives of the shareholders on the supervisory boards
(half the members of this board) tan be recalled before the expiration of their
Office term (usually five years) only with a supermajority of 75 % of the votes
cast. The members of the management boards tan, by resolution of the
supervisory board, be recalled prematurely only for Cause, although a recall
without Cause is valid until nullified by a tourt. However, if someone has6
succeeded in acquiring the majority, the board members will usually submit to
the development.
cc) A further impediment for takeovers financed by means of the assets of
the target (LBO’s) are the stritt capital protection rules of German corporate
law which prohibit these financial techniques. By the same token,
repurchases of shares as an antitakeover device are also prohibited.
dd) Antitrust law, the Ia w of groups of companies and labour law
specialties tan render takeovers difficult. If a bidder is a group of companies
or is going to be such a group by virtue of its acquisition it will be  subject to
the rules of the law of groups of companies which provide for the protection  of
minority shareholders and creditors of subsidiaries. Shutting down
laying off employees tan be a cumbersome and costly undertaking.
2. Statutory antitakeover provisons; preventive actions
Apart from these and other structural impediments some specific
plants or
statutory
antitakeover provisions and preventive actions are possible and tan be
observed. For the purpose of this article it should suffice to mention the most
common or sweeping ones rather than to display the whole Palette.
aal In 1990 the Statutes of 23 of the large stock corporations with widely
distributed shares provided for taps on voting nghts.14 In such a case a
shareholder cannot vote more than (usually) five percent of the stock
irrespective of the number of voting shares held by him. Since 1990 several
firms have eliminated this Provision. In the long run a firm with a controlling
shareholder will have to come to terms with a major shareholder despite a
voting limit if the latter is not to block everything, since the voting cap affects
only the voting right and not the other rights of a shareholder.15 Apart from
that, this Provision tan be overcome by help of “friends” who vote together
with the shareholder that seeks the control. That is the main issue in the
Conti-Pirelli case.7
W A much more effective means of preventing takeovers are registered
shares. It is contended in the literature that about one third of the German
stock corporations, among them 47 companies listed on stock exchanges, are
equipped with this device. l6 In such a case the management board has
broad discretion whether or not to register an acquirer.’ 7 The acquirer’s rights
as a shareholder depend on registration.
c4 Crossownerships between two firms up to a Stake of 25 % of the other
firm3 stock tan be organized by the managements of these firms. The
shareholders’ consent is not necessary. A famous example which was
recently reported by the financial press is the interlock between Dresdner
Bank and Allianz, the largest European insurer. This example Shows,
however, that such an alliance  cannot be entered into by management
without an underlying business rationale other than to provide a defense
against takeovers, and the acquisition of a Stake of, say, 15 % of the stock of
another large firm has to make sense in other respects, and has to be
approved by the supervisory board and explained to the shareholders and the
public.
W Another model which avoids these drawbacks  which tan be found in
practice consists of several large firms setting up a joint subsidiary  which
acquires small blocks of shares of the participating firms and acts as a “white
knight” in the event of a hostile takeover bid.18
There are other devices such as staggered boards, the issuance of
preference shares without voting rights and so forth which need not be
explained here fully to show that hostile takeovers face cultural and structural
impediments as well as obstacles set up for the purpose of obstructing the
acquisition of a controlling block of shares.
This takes us back to our question of how, if not by the threat of takeovers,
management in these firms is monitored. Theoretically there are several
instruments and devices which could serve to align the interests of the8
management with those of the stockholders, employees and creditors of the
firm:
Monitoring of the management by the supervisory board;
Pressure from the various factor markets (product, capital, labor) as
far as these are competitive;
Competition in the market for managers;
Incentives in contracts with the compensation of managers tied to
their Performance;
Monitoring by creditors;
The threat of bankruptcy
reputation; and
and the resultant loss of Prestige and
Legal rules under which managers must act with loyalty and care with
respect to the firm and its various stakeholders.
To be Sure, not all of these devices are thought of as aiming at the same goal;
the liability rules, for example, are more concerned with misbehaviour such as
self-interested conduct by management, rather than with monitoring
managerial efficiency.
Our focus here is not on all of these devices but only on the attempt of the
German System  to overcome the Problems of shareholders’ passivity in
monitoring management in Berle-Means type corporations by an institutional
arrangement rather than a market-oriented Solution (i.e., through the “market
for corporate control” or the threat of hostile takeovers). This institutional
Solution  consists of financial intermediaries (universal banks) which act as
proxy holders for small investors. The banks are better informed than small
investors and have the advantage of economies of scale when monitoring the
management. Hence, the “agency costs” due to asymmetric information and
collection action Problems of small shareholders in Berle-Means type
corporations tan perhaps be reduced by inserting these institutions. But new9
questions arise: What incentives do these institutions have to monitor
corporate activities? DO they really act on behalf of the shareholders? And
how is their Performance? Does “internal monitoring” by institutions have
limitations which a market Solution does not have? Are there other interests
which distract or deter them from pursuing their clients’ - the small
shareholders’ - interests? Are the “controllers” themselves “controlled”?
Before these questions tan be addressed, the System  and practice of the
depot banks should first be described for the benefit of the foreign reader.lg
IV. Banks as Institutional Monitors
1.
a)
The instruments
Proxy held by banks
The typical large German firm with dispersed shareholders finds its shares in
voting blocks which are voted by a few banks and which, if aggregated,
comprise up to 30 % or more of all votes.20 This voting power, which helps
place representatives of the banks on the supervisory board,21  Comes from
different sources: from directly owned stock,22 from investment companies
controlled by banks,23 or from voting the shares held by banks as custodians
for their clients.
Since the Separation of commercial banks and securities firms is unknown in
German banking law, banks are allowed to trade stock. They may also offer
their customers custodial or depository Services for those shares, administer
them (e.g., collect dividends), and vote them at shareholder meetings. Shares
of German publicly-held corporations are predominantly bearer shares;
smaller shares are mostly part of a Single global document. A shareholder
who wants to hold actual stock certificates will have to pay additionally for
them. This drives stock into institutions.
Banks need a special  written power of authority to vote the deposited shares.
There is no ceiling or cap limiting the exercise of the voting rights by banks to
a certain percentage of the firm’s stock capital.  The power of authority for the
bank, or proxy, cannot be given for more than fifteen months, and it is
revocable at any time. Before a shareholder meeting, banks have to
recommend to their customers how to vote, and must ask for special10
instructions. As a practical matter, special instructions are extremely rare.24 If
the shareholder does not give the bank special instructions, the bank is to
vote according to its recommendations. Generally, banks tan vote their
customers’ stock on any matter. In its own shareholder
a bank may only vote stock if it receives explicit
shareholders.26
meeting,25 however,
instructions from its
Banks do not Charge extra fees for voting their clients’ stock. There is only a
basic fee for their depot (custodial) Service.
bb) There are several older empirical studies on banks as proxy
holders.27 The most recent ones were published by Gotts~ha/I?~ and by
5öhm.2g Gottschalk selected those companies from the list of the 100 largest
firms in 1984 where more than 50 % of their stock was either widely held or
owned by banks. These 32 companies, with a (nominal) equity capital of DM
29.5 billion,  represented about a quarter of the nominal capital of all German
stock corporations. Among them were seven of the ten largest30  firms of the
Federal Republic.  Böhm extends this study on a smaller Sample of firms31
Unlike Böhm, Gotischalk’s study adds up the voting power of the banks’ own
shares, their depot shares, and shares held by investment companies, which
are bank subsidiaries. His study Shows the following results:
on average, banks represented more than four-fifths (82.67 %) of all votes
present in the meetings. With one exception, they represented at least a
majority (more than 50 %) of those votes present. Consequently, they were
able to elect the members of the supervisory board elected by the
shareholders (as opposed to those elected by the employees). Changes of
the Statutes of the corporation could not be effected against their votes. In 22
or two-thirds of the firms, the banks voted more than three-fourths of the stock
present and thereby could Change the Statutes. No other shareholder could
block these decisions. Note that most of these corporations (by the votes of
these very banks) have adopted provisions in their Statutes to the effect that
no one shareholder may vote more than (typically) 5 % of all shares of the
com pany.32 This rule, however, does not apply to banks in their capacity as
proxy holders voting for different clients.11
The breakdown in Gottschalk’s  study Shows that the voting rights are highly
concentrated in the three largest private banks (Deutsche Bank, Dresdner
Bank, and Commerzbank). Together these three banks voted on average
approximately 45 % of the stock that was represented at the general meetings
of the 32 companies.33 In almost half of these cases (15 firms), they together
held the majority; in a further one-third (10 firms) they had a blocking  minority.
In individual cases, one or another of the big banks dominates; in most cases
the votes are distributed roughly equally among them, or the other two banks
together have about the same number of votes as their competitor.34
The extent of coordinated behaviour of these banks in the voting process35
has not yet been empirically determined. A government commission  in its
report of 1978, noted that “the banks mostly vote in the same sense”.36
b) Banks as Shareholders
aa) A second Source of influence of banks in corporate affairs is their
Position as stockholders for their own account. According to German banking
law, credit institutions may acquire and hold stock in nonbank firms for their
own account; there are no rules which forbid or limit such holdings to a certain
percentage of the firm’s capital. There are only taps or limits with respect to
the bank’s capital to protect the depositors and creditors of the bank: a Single
participation  in one firm may not exceed 50 % of the capital of the bank.37
Further, investments of a bank in stockholdings and other illiquid assets may
not exceed its own capital.38
The Second EC Banking Directive lowers these limits: In the future no Single
holding may exceed 15 %, nor all holdings together 60 % of the capital  of the
bank.3g Additionally, the recent draft of an EC directive  concerning large
credits limits each Single “credit” (including participations on own account) to
25 % of the capital of the bank.4o Practically, however, these new rules will
not mean significant changes for German banks and their equity holdings.
W By the end of 1989 German credit institutions directly and through
subsidiaries held 4.69 % of all shares of domestic stock corporations41 (this
number includes subsidiaries of banks, such as corporations that own bank12
premises, etc.). For the issue of “banks and corporate control” this number
alone is not very informative. It does not teil us whether or in which banks
these holdings are concentrated; in how many cases these holdings are mere
portfolio investments rather than controlling blocks of shares; whether they
are acquired only for short term, for placement or trading purposes, or as a
long-term investment; or what the structure of the remaining shares is (i.e.,
whether they are widely dispersed or concentrated).
In his recent study Böhm analysed the shareholdings of banks in the 100
largest industrial firms (measured by turnover). In 1986 12 credit institutions
held participations in 22 of these firms.42 The list Shows that the holdings on
own account have little relation to the blocks of shares voted by banks in the
name of their clients. Second, the size of the holdings is not distributed
equally; they rank from about 5 % (holdings of all banks in one firm) up to
more than 50 % (holding of a Single bank in one firm). Third, the holdings are
rather stable over time. This impression is confirmed when we compare
recent with older data.43
Cl Interlocking directorates
aa) Influence on management, its decisions, its appointment and dismissal
is not exercised directly by the shareholders but by the supervisory board.
Therefore, seats on the supervisory board are crucial for every shareholder or
institution that wants to have a say in corporate governance, obtain relevant
information, etc. Banks influence or strengthen their influence on firms by
appointing members to the supervisory board of the companies. One tan find
bank managers and other professionals on these boards who are appointed
to multiple boards with the votes of the same institution, but such “informal”
relationships between a bank and these professional supervisory board
members are difficult to identify; however, interlocks with firms by board
members of the bank must be disclosed.44
Members of the managing board or the supervisory board of a bank tan be
members of the supervisory board of a firm, be it as a consequence of the13
credit relationship. That does not mean that management does not also try to
influence the selection  of its supervisors to a certain extent. As mentioned
earlier, the members of the supervisory board are - except of those elected by
the employees - elected by the shareholders. A Single person may not be a
member of more than ten boards at the same time. This rule, however, does
not restrain the institution which he or she represents. There is no rule in
German law that prohibits Service on boards of competing firms. Direct cross-
interlocks (the member of the supervisory board of Company A sitting on the
management board of Company B and vice versa) are forbidden.
As mentioned above, the supervisory board appoints the members of the
managing board and may dismiss them though only for Cause. It is reponsible
for monitoring the management, although practically it acts as an advisory
committee rather than as a monitoring panel45 except in times of financial
distress of the firm. To accomplish its duties, the board has the right to
receive comprehensive information. The management must report to it
periodically on all important questions, and the supervisory board may always
ask the management for reports. The supervisory board reviews the annual
reports and balance sheets of the firm. The board may require management
to obtain its Prior approval before entering into certain important transactions,
such as obtaining (or granting) loans above a specific amount. Board
members must treat Company information confidentially.
The chair of the supervisory board has a particularly influential position.46  He
prepares the meetings of the board - which are less frequent than, for
example, board meetings in the U.S.47 - proposes the agenda, and stays in
steady contact with the management. The management has to brief the chair
immediately on all important occasions. If there is a stalemate in a vote on a
board under a codetermination regime (a rare event), the chairman breaks the
tie.
bb) Comprehensive data on personal links between
Germany do not exist. Various studies have been done
different sectors.48
firms and banks in
at different times in
Let us have another look at the list of the 100 largest firms which has been
provided by Böhm49 92 of these firms had a supervisory board (numbers as14
of 1986); banks were represented on 75 (= 81 %) of these boards. They held
more than 10 % of all seats and more than 20 % of the seatl) of the
shareholders’ side of the board. On average they had more than 2
representatives on each board. The three Großbanken held more than 61 %
of all banks’ seats; the Deutsche Bank alone held 54 seats in 44 of these
largest firms. The key Position as president of the supervisory board was held
by banks’ representatives in 1986 in 20 of the 92 firms.
Although these numbers, which refer only to direct personal links between a
bank and the large firms, do not give us the whole picture of the potential
influence which tan be exerted by banks through the supervisory boards, it is
safe to say that there is a significant potential for banks to get information,
give advice and monitor management in most of these large firms. But do
banks really exert their influence and, if so, to what extent and with what
results? If these questions cannot be answered satisfactorily, tan we at least
say something about the incentives and disincentives to monitor or behave in
a way which might be advantageous for the bank, but disadvantageous for
the other shareholders, among them the bank’s clients?
2. Control, incentives and disincentives to monitor
a) “Control” tan mean various grades on a scale that Starts with the right
of a shareholder or a bank to information, which in turn Causes management
to refrain from certain actions, and ends with the power to recall the
incumbent management. In the following we consider (aa) control by means
of better access to information; (bb) influence by giving advice to
management on an ongoing basis; (cc) influence by appointing the members
of the management board; and (dd) interim and ex post monitoring. There are
certainly other ways for a bank to exert control, especially if it is also a lender
to the firm (scrutinizing of the borrower before granting or extending a credit;
monitoring during the credit relationship; pressure of the Claim to fixed
payments irrespective of the unsteady flow of returns to the borrowing firm;
threat of bankruptcy), and these means are perhaps even more important for
monitoring management than the instruments described here if one looks at
the extent and importante  of credit finance for German firms.50 Although the
means and devices available to a bank as a creditor do not stand in the15
Center  of our interest here, we also have to consider in the following the
extent to which the bank’s role as custodians is either reinforced or hampered
by their other role as (major) creditors  of the firm.
aal lnformation about somebody may influence that person3 behaviour if
the person is aware of it. As mentioned above, the management board must
report to the supervisory board on a continuing basis. Hence information
about the firm and its management, so far as it is given to the supervisory
board at all, is almost always immediately available to at least one bank on
the supervisory board. Thus, information about the Plans and the quality of
the firm% management tan be disclosed to these institutions without the need
to make this information public - information which the banks perhaps would
not get otherwise.
However, it is doubtful whether this argument is valid. Remember the rather
infrequent meetings of the supervisory board. A poll of banks done by  Fischer
Shows that a bank does not expect to get any better or more thorough
information from its representatives on the board than it already has as the
firm’s creditor.51 In addition, members of the supervisory board must keep
confidential the information they get in that capacity.52  Board members are
normally well aware of this because the breach of this duty is a criminal
offence.53
In all, it does not seem very likely that the information which a bank gets from
its Position on the supervisory board puts a tighter rein on management than
would be the case without board membership.
W Bank representatives on supervisory boards have specialized
knowledge, particularly in the field of finance. Very often they have an Office
back in their bank with special facilities, such as the help of an assistant, to
support them in their work as a board member. The large banks have
departments specialized in corporate finance, analyzing the financial markets
as well as the financial needs of their client firms. This information, too, is
available to the representatives of these banks. Thus, these representatives
tan provide the respective  firms with specialized advice, financial knowledge
and informa tion.16
Banks may not be able to run industrial firms themselves, but from the
activities of their representatives on supervisory boards they know the
manager market quite weil. They should at least be able, by the exercise of
their stock voting rights, to appoint the right People to the supervisory board,
which in turn tan provide management with information and experience in
other fields.54 A poll done by Bleicher Shows that nine of ten board members
in his Sample believe that the actual influence of their advice on management
is “strong.US This belief, of course, does not mean that this is in fact the
case, especially given the rather infrequent Sessions of the supervisory board,
although there is some evidente that there are informal contacts between the
board and management between the sessions? Certainly one also must
make a distinction between the chairman of the supervisory board and the
members of certain subcommittees on the one hand, and the “regular”
members on the other.
ca Where advice cannot be given because of institutional impediments
(infrequent Sessions, for instance), and where the supervisory board cannot
monitor the management (see subsection (dd), below), the more important is
the question of whether the supervisory board is capable  of sorting out
managers from fhe beginning who appear capable of doing a good job -
because of the Pattern of their behavior in the past, their career and previous
success - even if their efforts cannot be observed on an ongoing basis. This
seems, indeed, to be the most important task of the Supervisor-y board, and
banks seem to play some role in this respect.
It has already been mentioned that the members of the management board
are appointed by the supervisory board and that - in large German
corporations - one half of the members of the supervisory board is elected by
the shareholders. That means that in our sample57  all banks together
determine who sits on the shareholders’ side of the supervisory board, even if
there are no personal interlocks. Furthermore, if there is an open conflict
between shareholders’ and employees’ representatives on the board, the
shareholders could push their management candidate through, because of
the tie-braking vote of the chairperson.58 That means that banks have a
decisive influence on who gets into the management boardroom even though
the members of the Supervisor-y  board are legally independent and may -
should a conflict arise - act independently. To the extent one bank dominates17
the shareholders’ meeting, is represented on the nominating committee of the
supervisory board or holds the Position of chairperson, its influence will be
greater accordingly.5g
In their roles as creditors,  shareholders, proxyholders and their representation
on many supervisory boards, banks should know the market for managers
quite weil. Nevertheless, bankers’ influence on the appointment of managers
could be detrimental if only one institution, with perhaps doubtful knowledge
about the firm’s particular sector, had to decide. But that seems not to be the
case. If we keep in mind that the three big banks often have similar voting
holdings or that two of them tan outweigh the other, that the members of the
supervisory board are not bound to follow the instructions of the shareholders,
and that the shareholders’ representatives would think long and hard before
they pushed a candidate through against the vote of the employees, then it
becomes clear that a candidate for the management board has to pass
several tests of qualification and approval and is not simply appointed by one
dominating institution.
W With regard to monitoring management, it is useful to differentiate
between interim and ex post monitoring.
Interim monitoring tan occur especially in cases where the management must
ask the supervisory board for its consent, like, for instance, if the
management Plans to shut down a plant, enter into a loan agreement and so
forth. Another case where the supervisory board is likely to interfere is where
the firm is in financial distress. Apart from these cases, “interim monitoring”
activities seem to be limited!O
But the supervisory board may be able to measure the performante of the
management by its results at the end of certain periods  (i). If so, there may be
incentive for management to perform weil even if it is not monitored
continuously, if management tan be recalled in the case of disappointing
results (ii). At first sight, expost monitoring in this sense does not seem to be
directly related to the role that banks in particular have in corporate
governance, and could theoretically occur without them. There is, however, a
link between the ex post monitoring role of the supervisory board and the
existente of depot institutions. It becomes evident when one considers the18
differente between a board System with outside directors on the board who
are there because of the influence of the managing directors, the chairman or
the CE0 on one side and a two-tier System  on the other where you have
“outside” supervisory board members who are appointed by large influential
institutions in the shareholder meetings rather than by the incumbent
management. The readiness of the supervisory board members to act and, if
necessary, even to dismiss or not to prolong the contracts of the members of
the management board should be stronger because of the independence
guaranteed through the existente and role of influential institutions in the
shareholder meetings.
(0 How does the supervisoty board measure the Performance of the
incumbent management? According to German law management must
prepare and publish the firm’s balance sheet and profit and loss Statement
annually. Both are reviewed by independent public accountants who are
responsible to the supervisory board and report to it. There are additional
obligatory interim reports that are provided to the supervisory board only. The
supervisory board tan then put further questions to the management,
compare the results of the firm with past results as well as with those of the
firm’s competitors (to the extent that such information tan be obtained) and
thus get at least a partial picture of the Performance or mistakes of the
incumbent management as a whole and perhaps also of individual members
of the management board. To the extent to which this information is disclosed
to the internal supervisory board only and not to the capital market, this
“institutional” Solution may have an advantage over the market if it also
provides for appropriate reactions  (see subsection (ii), below).
The Observation that this internal monitoring System  relies very much on
comparisons with previous results, Plans and the results of the industry
competitors hints at a limitation of such an internal monitoring System which
will be examined later, in the context of and the comparison with, takeovers. A
potential outside bidder may have information about, say, a new technology
which the board of a specific firm does not have. Is “outside” governance by
(hostile) takeovers which forces a firm to react to technological changes
before the competitive process on the product markets will do so a necessary
Supplement to an internal monitoring System which fails in such cases?6119
(ii) Can boards react, and do they really react, if they observe bad
Performance? If so, this tan be anticipated by management and give it an
incentive to try harder.
A member of the management board tan be recalled only for Cause before
the expiration date of his or her term.62 For this reason, as well as because  of
the attendant bad Publicity, such recalls occur only in cases of criminal
offences, etc.
Practically, there is the more subtle threat of not renewing the contract after
its expiration (a manager’s term may not last longer than five years; at that
Point, the supervisory board must explicitly decide whether or not to renew
it).63 Poensgen and Lukas have published an interesting empirical study in
which they show that there is significant involuntary “fluctuation” of
management board members not only in cases of very serious Problems  or
the financial distress of the firm,64 but also in “lighter” cases in which the
supervisory board was not content with the Performance of individual
managers or with the management board as a whole% To be Sure, the fact
that there is significant involuntary fluctuation  does not by itself say anything
about the monitoring ‘performante” of the supervisory boards. Did they react
too late, did they dismiss the right People,  on what Signals did they react, and
are there certain directions in which their incentives might drive management?
This issue certainly deserves further research, and until such studies are
made it seems difficult to maintain that one corporate governance System or
the other Shows  better results and should be preferred.
To get closer to an answer to this question we also need to take into
consideration the incentives and disincentives for institutions like banks for
corporate control. The following sections  try to address this.
b) Incentives for control
Why do banks get involved in corporate governance, act as proxy holders and
hold positions on supervisory boards?20
aa) Banks are compensated through fees for their custodial Services. But
that alone does not explain why banks vote their own and their clients’ stock,
appoint their managers to the supervisory boards of other firms, and spend
money to support their monitoring work. Banks could (as owners of stock)
free-ride, and their customers could redeposit their stock with institutions that
promised no monitoring but also no expenses.
As to the latter, such Services are not offered in the market. Banks could
easily drive such competing institutions out of the market by Cross-subsidizing
their depot business. Further, investment companies that are subsidiaries of
banks will not try to dilute the Position  of their parent banks.
W There may be other incentives or advantages that accrue to banks
from their governance activities. First, they tan try to protect their own equify
investrnent.  As our overview has shown, banks hold, besides their Position as
proxy holders of their clients, equity stakes that rank from stakes as small as
O 1 % of a firm3 stock up to more than 50 /o.66 The right to vote their clients’
stock (at low additional costs) gives banks leverage to protect or strengthen
their own investment without making capital infusion. For instance, if a bank
holds an equity Position of 12 % of a firm’s stock and commands another
15 % through its clients’ deposited shares, it has a blocking Position against
the issuance of new stock and the elimination of shareholders’ preemptive
rights67 that it would not have as a 12 % owner alone.
ca Secondly, banks tan try to protect their other (credit) investment in fhe
firm.
Creditors face the Problem  of “asymmetric  information”, both before the
conclusion of a loan contract and thereafter. It is often argued that an equity
Stake of a bank in the borrowing firm will improve the information for the bank,
and reduce the Problem of asymmetric  information.  That is doubtful.
Typically, a shareholder will not receive earlier or better information than
would a creditor bank (although, to be Sure, a small creditor and a majority
shareholder with immediate access to the management should not be
compared). Even if the bank is represented on the firm3 board, this will21
normally not provide the bank with better or earlier information than it already
has as creditor.6g
If these positions do not provide the bank with better information, they may
nonetheless help to exclude or minimize risks for the bank during the course
of a credit relationship and thus lower the agency costs associated with debt.
There is no doubt that a bank tan improve its Position as creditor in certain
aspects  if it is equity owner or votes stock of the firm for its clients at the same
time. A creditor commanding  51 % of the votes in the shareholders’ meeting
of this borrower tan choose who manages the firm. Perhaps the creditor is
not capable of electing the best managers, but at least they will choose
People who implicitly promise  not to harm the interests of the creditor by
engaging in risky projects,  distribution of assets to shareholders, etc., without
the bank’s approval. As the threshold at which the bank’s own equity
investment is able to command a majority will be normally too high, the
addition of the depot shares of the bank’s clients seems to be a perfett
arrangement to get the necessary leverage on the management to protect  the
bank’s own (equity as well as) credit investment. Certainly, this power usually
has to be shared with other banks, but as creditors of the firm they have, at
least to a large extent, parallel interests with regard to the management.
If this is so, we tan expect that credit finance for these firms plays a more
important role (in terms of availability and costs of credit finance as well as
higher leverage) than it does for firms in an environment in which banks do
not have a comparable Position, and, as mentioned above, this indeed seems
to be the caseiro.
W Another incentive for a bank to acquire and vote stock tan be to
Capture all or at least a parl of fhe firm3 financial business. In his study on
“housebank relationships”, however, Fischer concludes that exclusive
relationships between banks and firms are rather the exception today. They
still tan be found between small firms and banks. But publicly-held
corporations with widely distributed stock (which to a large extent is, as
shown, voted by the banks) may have five to ten “primary” banking
relationships and a number of additional connections to other banks.7122
Regrettably, the study does not analyze the question whether there are
syndicates rather than exclusive business relationships with a Single bank, as
has always been contended in the literature, especially for the fee-based
business like underwriting,72 and whether these syndicates reflect the shares
of their members in the shareholders’ meeting. Certainly, a management
board will think long and hard before it chooses to give a considerable part of
its financial business, such as raising capital through issuance of bonds or
shares, to the competitors of those banks represented in its shareholders’
meeting if the latter offer the same Services on roughly the same conditions.
Cl Disincentives
Are there also disincentives to banks in engaging in corporate control
activities?
aa) A bank which is an institutional shareholder and offers other (financial)
Services at the same time could be eager to gef into or keep up a business
relationship and therefore refrain from being a nuisance to management at
least as long as things run comparably well.73 This depends on questions
that differ in each individual case: what Position do the offering banks and
other banks have regarding management and tan management
independently decide to prefer a competitor or an “outside” bank?
W Another disincentive could come from irnplicit management coalifions.
The large banks themselves are generally corporations with widely distributed
ownership.74  That could lead to the same “sympathetic” understanding of
how corporate governance should function, or even to certain
“arrangements”. The most simple way would be to have Cross-interlocks
(manager A sits on the supervisory board of Company B and vice versa).
That, however, is forbidden.75 In the past, banks have helped managements
of other large firms, whose stock they vote, to protect their own and the other
managers’ interests against takeovers, by changing the Statutes of the
respective corporations.76 This may have been done to protect the banks’
Position  as proxy holders and thereby the banks’ own equity investments, or23
to protect or promote such banks’ business relationships rather than to do the
management of these firms a favour. But for whatever reasons, protection
against hostile takeovers as a means of management control does not mean
protection against control altogether if there are other “institutional” devices of
control.
A last remark on disincentives to monitor should be made with respect to the
banks themselves. As our statistics prove, managements of these banks tan
punish each other to a certain extent because they hold and vote roughly the
similar amounts of proxies for voting shares in the other banks.77 Hence
there seems to be a strong disincentive at work in monitoring and controlling
the other banks’ managements. Instead of a control through this method and
through the other monitoring devices mentioned earlier,78  monitoring of bank
management may occur through state supervision (i.e., the central bank and
the banking supervisory authority) and the media.
3. Drawbacks
As we analyze institutions which represent small investors in shareholder
meetings and on boards and act as corporate monitors in the shareholders’
place, we should ask three questions: What are their incentives; are there
conflicts of interests or other drawbacks, and how, in turn, are these
institutions monitored themselves? So far I have only tried to describe the role
of banks in corporate governance, their instruments, incentives, and
disincentives. This may be accepted as a Substitute for the more precise
measurements of their Performance which our economists still owe us. The
following patt will deal briefly with the question of whether there are
drawbacks  connected with this governance System (other than those already
mentioned as possible disincentives). “Drawbacks” means disadvantages for
the shareholders as well as for the respective firms. They may result from
conflicts of interests on the part of the depot banks. Or there may be
disadvantages for the shareholders that are clients of the depot banks if these
institutions, which are thought to control management on behalf of their
clients, remain uncontrolled themselves.
The following remarks on drawbacks will, however, not deal with the political
debate. The role and “power” of German banks, especially the Großbanken,
have been discussed for decades. This section also does not deal with the24
possible risks for the banks and their depositors (which is not presently an
issue, and for which prudent regulation should be capable of providing),7g the
impacts on the German stock market, the question of the “equity capital
shortage” of German firms,80 the abuse of confidential information, the role of
the banks in the concentration process,81 or other antitrust questions - issues
which normally dominate the discussion about bank-firm relationships.82
a) Large voting right holdings of a bank and its representation on the
supervisory board may drive management into an exclusive business
relationship  with this bank. This tan be advantageous to the firm (through the
commitment of the bank as a Source of finance and lowered risks because of
better possibilities to monitor and control management and the resulting
easier and eheaper access to credit finance).83 On the other hand, such a
Situation may be exploited by a controlling bank to the detriment of “its” firm.
When we look at the distribution of votes among several institutions,
however, such an “exploitation” by one offeror does not seem very likely.
Even if this were proved empirically, it would be difficult to weigh up the
advantages and drawbacks of such “stable” business relationships.85  - As
there are several large banks represented in the general meetings, the
question rather is whether these banks share at least a part of the respective
firm’s business. Such an oligopolistic behaviour is often contended in the
literature for the fee-based underwriting and floating business.86 As to the
lending business, “exploitation” through the imposition of interest rates above
the market price seems unlikely. Admittedly, asking for the market price may
still be advantageous for banks which have better information or better means
to monitor their borrower than an “outside” lender. To the extent to which a
firm pays more than under competitive circumstances, these premiums tan
be considered to be agency fees paid by the shareholders to the bank for its
Service of monitoring management.
b) Another Charge in this context is that institutional proxy holders who
are also creditors may not support a profitable, innovative (and - perhaps -
more risky) policy aimed at maximizing shareholder value. Or, to put it
differently, banks may influence investment decisions of the firm to protect  an
already existing credit relationship, and they may prefer projects which need25
(higher) external (credit) finance rather than preferring projects with a
comparatively higher net present value for the firm (rather than the banks)
and which are of greater benefit for the shareholders.87 Banks may indeed
have this preference if they are not themselves shareholders. And if the
assertions of the managerialists are correct that corporate managers do not
pursue profit maximization, but rather size or growth maximization,88  then
there seems to be an implicit agreement between managers and depot banks
on a mutually favourable Pattern at the expense of the shareholders.89 On
the other hand, debt is always looked at as a device to discipline
management.gO So why should management yield to its alleged incentives for
growth maximization with the help of credit finance? Here we simply need a
more systematic analysis  of the relation between the financing Patterns of
large firms and the underlying interests.
Cl A related issue concerns the divide& policy of firms. Management
may prefer to retain earnings rather than distribute them as they accrue since
this provides a way to conceal fluctuations in future earnings and thereby to
reduce management’s accountability for losses. And retained earnings give
management the means to achieve growth maximization without being
monitored by outside financiers,  even at the expense of the shareholders (i.e.,
through “free cash flow”).gl lt is contended in the literature that banks support
this restrictive dividend policy of managements either because they want to
get at least a share of the firm’s financial businessg2 or - and that seems to
be the main argument - in Order to protect their credit investments.g3 On the
other hand, retaining dividends means that managements become
increasingly independent and “emancipated” from external finance the larger
the internal funds grow. But perhaps banks tend to neglect this long-term
development in Order to protect  their present interests. Furthermore, there are
limits to the “emancipation”  of managements because of the role which banks
play in their function as proxies in shareholder meetings and on supervisory
boards. Here again one would like to see more theoretical and empirical
studies on this Point, with reference to the tax and other tost issues which
affect a firm’s dividend policy.d) Even if there is no abuse there is, as our summary has shown,
certainly a potential for it because of conflicts of interests. There is a
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longstanding discussion about how abuse tan effectively be avoided without
destroying the advantage of having an institutional arrangement which
overcomes shareholders passivity and serves as a professional monitor. lt is
not necessary to go into this discussion here in detail; suffice it to say that the
existing rules and provisions against potential abuse seem not to be sufficient
and could and should be amended.g4 Another Problem which tan only be
mentioned here is how the efforts and the Performance of these institutions
which monitor managements on behalf of small investors tan themselves be
measured and controlled.  By installing an institution to solve the “principal-
agent” Problem on the level of the corporation, we get a new “principal-agent”
Problem on the level of the intermediary. DO we have similar Problems (i.e.,
asymmetric information, collective action, etc.) on this second Stage too, and
how tan these be solved?g5
Although these questions concerning the monitoring Performance of the depot
institutions as agents of the shareholders remain unanswered, in the following
a first attempt is made to compare this institutional Solution with a market
Solution, more specifically, with the threat of hostile takeovers. This threat has
often been claimed in the Iiterature to align adequately the interests of
shareholders and managers, and to address the Problem of managerial
inefficiency. Would such a Solution avoid the Problems  which are connected
with the institutional Solution, such as conflicts of interests, lack of control,
etc.; would it even show better results, or are there other imperfections and
drawbacks connected with this Solution? The following section will try to
address these questions.
V. Market and Institutional  Monitoring - a Comparison
A comparison between market and institutional monitoring Systems has to
statt with several caveats.
First, such a comparison is necessarily narrowsighted in that it Picks out only
one instrument from among several which are meant to cope with managerial
inefficiency, self-dealing and related Problems, and which are meant to
Supplement each other within a given legal System. If, for instance, the27
takeover market cannot deal with individual instances of management
selfdealing but the institutional control of managers perhaps tan, there may
be, in a System which relies on market rather than on institutional control of
managers, supplementary instruments available which may be even more
capable of dealing with this specific Problem.
Secondly, such a comparison is of limited value because the possible policy
consequences seem to be very limited. Even if such a comparison could
provide us with reliable results at this time and show us the advantages and
disadvantages of both Systems, that would not necessarily mean that the
other System  could be adopted and implanted into a completely different
environment. For example, since there are specific structural impediments to
takeovers in German corporate law, as was shown earlier,g6  the threat of
takeovers would presumably show different results than in a System which is
more responsive to this incentive. On the other hand, it does not seem very
likely that public policy and regulators in the Anglo-American countries would
permit banks to play a role similar to that in Germany, even if banks had more
and better incentives to monitor management on behalf of small shareholders
than other institutions (such as Pension funds).
Thirdly, the following comparison cannot deal with all aspects, all pros and
cons of (hostile) takeovers on one handg7 and the influence of banks on firms
on the other.g8 The focus has to be and will be limited on the potential of
these monitoring Systems for monitoring management efficiently.
1. Divergente of interests of shareholders and managers
A good starting Point for a comparison is Professor Eisenberg’s list of cases in
which the interests of shareholders and managers diverge.gg  Eisenberg
differentiates between “shirking,” “traditional conflicts of interests” and
“positional conflicts.” If efforts of an agent cannot be observed, and his
Performance not be controlled, he has no disincentive to work at a slack pace
and to avoid the effort and discomfort involved in adapting to changed
circumstances (“shirking”). “Traditional conflicts of interest” means the
potential interest of agents in diverting the principal’s assets to their own use
through unfair self-dealing. The third potential divergente of interests are“positional conflicts”: the interest of top corporate managers in maintaining
and enhancing their Position  even at the shareholders’ expense. Positional
conflicts may occur in a great variety of ways: among other measures,
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managers tan make it particularly difficult to monitor their performante,
impose high barriers to their own removal, seek to increase corporate size or
“free cash flow” in Order to maximize their power, Prestige and salary rather
than to maximize the firm’s value. How do both hostile takeovers
institutional monitoring through banks cope with these Problems?
and
a) To Start with, neither device is aimed at prohibiting or lessening
Problems  like shirking and self-dealings if these are Problems  at all. Most top
managements will certainly refrain from shirking because their self-esteem is
tied to work and accomplishment, and the selection  process on the
management market as well as the mutual control among agentsloO tends to
exclude this Pattern.
b) Also, most top managers will probably refrain from unfair self-dealing
because they have internalized the rules of social morality.lol  The takeover
market likely has very little impact on such traditional conflicts of interest. A
hostile takeover bid does not succeed unless it includes a premium that is
significantly above the market price. lo2 A hostile bidder must also pay large
fees to advisors such as lawyers, investment bankers and others. Hence, a
takeover bid would not be economically justified if the bidder’s only aim is to
end unfair self-dealing by managers.lo3  That means that other legal
provisions must deal with this particular  conflict of interest, and the same is
true for a System  which relies on institutions like banks rather than on
takeovers as a monitoring device. If a supervisory board finds out about unfair
self-dealing of management, that does not happen just because banks have
representatives on the board.
c) Much more interesting are the effects of takeovers and institutional
control on positional conflicts. lt seems clear that takeover activity is, among
several other factors like synergy gains etc., also motivated by the inefficiency
of the target’s management.to4 Here the first question is whether the29
“outside” bidder has information about the inefficiency of incumbent
management, such as whether the stock price of a firm is lower than that of
industry peers because of inefficient management. An “inside” monitor like a
bank may have an informational advantage in this respect.  The next question
then is whether and under which circumstances an outside bidder and an
inside institutional monitor will react when they observe inefficiency. Putting to
the side for the moment other factors such as synergy gains, etc., the bidder
will only act if a takeover and replacement of incumbent management will
produce sufficient gains to justify the huge premium and out-of-pocket
transaction costs required - something that does not seem very likely if
management is not excessively inefficient.lo5  An “inside” monitor who is
represented on the supervisory board tan act without incurring these costs.
The Problem here, however, is that an institutional monitor with personal
business interests in the firm has incentive not to act in cases in which
“inefficiency” of the management, such as seeking to increase corporate size
or maximize cash and other resources at the disadvantage of the firm and its
shareholders, is favourable to the monitor.lo6 Hence it is not very likely that
initiatives for restructuring, disposing of underperforming subsidiaries, or
splitting up a conglomerate  will come from banks’ representatives
the firm is not in financial distress.lo7
as long as
2. Ex ante, interim and ex post monitoring
A further differente is remarkable. Institutional and market control by threat of
hostile takeover differ also in that control by management replaces by way of
a takeover is merely expost control whereas institutional control is not. To be
Sure, the idea of control by the threat of replacement is thought to give
management incentive in advance to try harder. But it works differently from
the ex ante, interim and ex post monitoring by an inside institutional monitor.
Firstly, as Eisenberg has pointed out, the threat of takeover will not affect the
behaviour of managers who do not realize they are inefficient, and do their
best as they see it: they are already doing all they can.lo8 Especially in such
cases a System should be preferred which does not react only after the firm
has incurred considerable losses. Identifying competent  managers from the
beginning, gathering information continuously and familiarity with the
qualifications of management could avoid this.30
3. Turnover vs. “relational” monitoring
The notion that the governance System which we are examining is based on a
lang-term  relationship between a few depot institutions and the respective
firms reveals another contrast to a System in which no “intermediaries”  stand
between management and institutional or private shareholders, shareholders
who themselves are not active in corporate governance except by “voting with
their feet,” especially in the case of a takeover. Private shareholders, like
institutional shareholders, may have short “shareholding horizons.” That may
be because they have to sell their shares, in the case of an individual, for
purposes of private needs for liquidity or, in the case of, say, a Pension fund,
because it has to make disbursements to pensioners. Or shares may be sold
because the investor or fund manager believes he has identified a mispriced
share, or because the shareholder is offered a higher price than the actual
market price by a bidder. Short shareholding horizons and a high turnover in a
firm’s shares make it difficult for the Company to establish meaningful
relationships and two-way communications with its shareholders. Short term
investments in a firm’s stock do not only make it difficult for shareholders to
influence a company’s affairs, leaving the takeover mechanism as the major
corrective device to align the interests of management with those of
constantly changing shareholders. lt may even lead to the question of extent
to which shareholders who own stock only for a comparably short period of
time should be given influence and say in corporate affairs at all by those who
formulate the Charter, by-laws and applicable  regulations of the corporation.  In
a System where proxies are given to “professional” institutions which remain
the same over time irrespective of the turnover in the underlying shares, long-
term relationships and two-way communications between management and
such interested and responsive proxyholders tan be established, and there
may be more willingness to give more information and to concede more rights
and influence to shareholders represented by such institutions. Of course, the
question arises again of whether and to what extent such stable relationships
between management and professional proxyholders with own business or
equity interests in the firm are favourable or detrimental to the  small investors
because of the conflicts of interests or the lack of control in the relationship
between these intermediaries and the shareholders, as mentioned above.31
4. Long-term vs. short-term
How do managers behave in a System without stable lang-term relationships
with their shareholders and the threat of a hostile takeover above their heads?
DO they, in Order to satisfy the greediness of the investors and to keep the
stock prices high, slash expenditures which pay off only in the long-term?
That has frequently been contended in the literature as well as in the political
debate, and Anglo-American scientists and policy-makers apparently become
increasingly concerned about the short-term issue? Og
Research and development expenditures of firms in various nations are
compared, and specific institutional features like quarterly reports, interim
dividends, or the investment policy of Pension funds and other institutional
investors are blamed for forcing managements to take short term views.
Hostile takeovers are said to contribute to this, too. The Plans  of the EC
Commission to abolish taps on shareholder voting rights and dual class
voting (“Höchststimmrechte” and “Mehrfachstimmrechte”) under the Fifth EC
directive has been strongly opposed by German industry, especially on the
grounds that (hostile) takeover activity would lead to short-termism and have
negative impacts  on resource allocation  and the German economy as a
whole. Is a bank-oriented corporate governance System  (without hostile
takeovers) advantageous in this respect?
As to hostile takeovers, the debate among economists seems to date to be
unsettled. In one Version investors are short-sighted and behave myopically to
sacrifice long-term benefits for immediate Profits. As a consequence, firms
that engage in long-term planning and make substantial investments in
research and development (R & D) are supposedly undervalued by the
market and become takeover targets. 1 1 o Shleifer and Vishny have argued
that the short time horizon of arbitrage investors, who focus on short-term
assets because they are relatively less expensive to arbitrage, may result in
market underpricing of a corporation’s equity. This phenomenon in turn is said
to impose a short time horizon on managers, who thus avoid long-term
investments that depress share prices over the short term and make the
corporation vulnerable to a hostile takeover? 1 1 Stein has developed a formal
model in which the threat of takeovers encourages myopic behaviour on the
part of managers. A central prediction of this model is that firms that construct32
barriers to takeovers are able to increase profitable lang-term investments
such as research and development (Ft & D).’ l2 There is, however, empirical
evidente that firms actually decrease Ft & D intensity after the introduction of
shark repellents, thus failing to support this prediction. These findings suggest
that takeover impediments may even reduce incentives to engage in long-
term investments.l13  Furthermore, there is evidente that the market
responds positively to announcements of increases in R & D and other capital
investment expendituresl  1 4 which, on the other hand, does not mean that
there informational asymmetries between the markets and firms with respect
to such expenditures may not still remain, such as instances where
management does not want to communicate commercially sensitive
information to the market. And it may well be that managers, in Order to avoid
undervalued stock which might lure hostile bidders, shift from profitable long-
term investment to short-term projects - although this hardly seems to be a
good defence against unwanted bids.’ 1 5
As this debate cannot be continued from the outside, would it be possible at
least to establish that the corporate governance structure in German large
firms supports long-term views of management? Although to my knowledge
there are no empirical data available with respect to these large firms, my
guess certainly is that management in these firms are encouraged to maintain
a focus on the long term: firstly, managers in these firms are usually elected
for five years, and tan be recalled Prior to the expiration of their term only for
Cause.’ l6 Secondly, the equity holdings of banks as well as the amount of
proxies which are given to them remain rather stable over time irrespective  of
the fact that the underlying stock is traded. That means that the monitoring
institutions remain the same over time. Thus, long-term projects tan be
discussed and explained to them, and this discussion is a dialogue rather
than merely giving a “Signal” to an anonymous market which will “mirror” it by
pricing the firms value. On the other side, we must also take into account the
incentives of banks as creditors. Banks might, as creditors, prefer projects
which are comparatively less profitable.’ 1 7
In short, there is no clearcut answer to our question as to whether the
elements of the governance Systems discussed here favour rather than
discourage long-term investments with higher net present values.33
5. Adaptability to Change
a) It has already been mentioned that in Order to assess the efforts and
results of the management an internal monitoring System  must rely on a
comparison of actual results with the results of the firm for former periods,  the
firm’s Plans and the results of the firm’s competitors within the same industry.
This hints at a limitation of such an internal monitoring System where “outside
governance” may have an advantage: a potential outside bidder may have
information about, say, a new technology  which management and the
supervisory board of a firm do not have and which is not yet in use within the
industry. Is outside governance by (hostile) takeovers which forces a firm to
adapt and react to technological changes a necessary Supplement to an
internal monitoring System which fails in such cases?
In this respect one should differentiate between the mere dissemination of
information on one side and the reluctance of the incumbent management
and supervisory board on the other. Hostile takeovers are not necessary to
disseminate
technologies.
ways.
new information about, e. g., new value - increasing
Information tan be sold to the firm or shared with it in other
b) Management and the members of the Supervisor-y  board may,
however, be reluctant to make changes that raise the market value of the firm
even if the Steps that have to be taken to raise the value are known. This may
be because the required changes in a declining industry, such as layoffs,
wage reductions, investment cutbacks, or divestitures, would harm the
employees who are considered more important to the organization than
shareholders or because members of the supervisory board fear the negative
Publicity or Problems with local authorities that would result from such
unpopular decisions. In such cases, a hostile bidder could buy the firm and
implement profit-increasing changes against the wishes of both the board and
the top management of the target. More generally, takeovers could play a role
in bringing about a necessary shift in a firm’s policy and in replacing
managers whom the supervisory board is unable or unwilling to forte to take
the necessary Steps.There is interesting empirical evidente especially for this role of hostile
takeovers during the merger wave of the eighties in the U.S. Merck, Shleifer
34
and Vishny examined the circumstances under which a company’s poor
Performance leads to an internal governance response - the incumbent board
replacing management - as opposed to the external governance response of
a hostile takeover. Tracking a Sample of 454 of Fortune 500 companies over
the period 1981 - 1985, the authors concluded that an internal governance
response is more likely when a Company performs poorly compared with
industry competitors, but that hostile takeovers are predictable based on poor
Performance of the entire industry. In cases in which whole industries (e. g.,
airlines, steel, or Oil) were performing poorly corporate boards apparently
were reluctant to take the necessary Steps to increase the value of the firms
by removing irresponsive managers. Instead, this function has been
accomplished by hostile takeovers. Apparently takeover organizers have
taken advantage of opportunities raised by the ineffectiveness
control devices. 1 1 8
VI. Concluding Remarks
of internal
This overview and the thoughts expressed above may have shown that the
German experience with its corporate governance System  in large firms is
both ambivalent enough and empirically unexplored to suggest great care in
using it as a Point of comparison for discussion of these issues or for making
policy recommendations in other national contexts. lt nevertheless seems
safe to say that an institution-based or “relational” governance System and a
market for corporate control focus on different Problems for which the other
System  is less able to offer solutions. Hence they should be considered as
supplementary rather than as mutually exclusive Systems?  lg But this
approach, which has also been adopted by the EC Commission in its
proposals for a Fifth and Thirteenth Directive on Company law leads to new
questions: tan these two governance Systems really be combined, or will the
development of a takeover market destroy the existing “relational”
governance System or Change it, and if so, with what results? The
of the EC Commission for the Fifth and Thirteenth Directives must
discussed in this light.
proposals
be further35
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Table I
Voting blocks of the banks at the sharehokler  meetings of the 100 largest firms in 1986*
Rank of
Company
in 1984
Yo of
shares
present
at the
meeting
96 of shares
voted by
Deutsche Dresdner Commetz- All 3 All
Bank Bank bank big banks
banks
1 Siemens 6064 1784 10,74 4,14 32,52 79,63
2 Daimler Benz 61,02 4130 16,76 1,07 6166 6934
Mercedes-Holding 6720 11,65 1366 12,24 37,75 57,35
3 Volkswagen 50,13 2,94 3,70 133 798 19,53
5 Bayer 53,16 30,62 16,91 6977 54,50 95,76
6 BASF 55,40 26,07 1743 6,18 5168 9664
7 Hoechst 57,73 14,97 1692 31,60 83,48 98,34
9 VEBA 50,24 1999 23,08 585 4792 98,18
11 Thyssen 6848 9,24 11,45 1193 32,82 53,ll
12 Deutsche Bank 55,lO 47,17 9,15 4,04 60,36 97,23
13 Mannesmann 5063 20,49 20,33 9,71 50,53 95,40
18 M.A.N. (GHH) 64,lO 6,97 9,48 13,72 30,17 52,85
21 Dresdner Bank 56,79 13,39 4798 3,57 64,04 98,16
27 Allianz-Holding 66,20 9,91 11,14 2,35 23,4l 60,08
28 Karstadt 77,60 37,03 8,81 33,02 78,86 87,27
29 Hoesch 45,39 15,31 1563 16,73 47,67 92,39
34 Commerzbank 5050 1630 9,92 34,58 80,81 96,77
35 Kaufhof 66,70 629 13,33 37,18 56,80 98,45
36 Klöckner-Werke 89,13 1730 3,78 3,55 24,63 53,00
37 KHD 72,40 4422 3,82 150 4954 6529
41 Metallg’schaft 90,55 16,42 48,85 0,35 65,82 75,95
44 Preussag 6958 11,15 560 259 19,34 99,68
51 Degussa 70,94 688 33,03 1,89 41,79 67,09
52 Bayr.Vereinsbank 62,40 11,42 2,71 3,59 17,72 88,69
56 Continental 3529 22977 999 6,04 38,81 95,55
57 Bayr. Hypobank 6790 586 7,05 120 14,ll 92,09
59 Deutsche Babcock 67,13 758 9,67 529 22,54 97,Ol
67 Schering 4660 2386 1746 10,17 5150 99,08
68 Linde 5299 22,76 15,73 2136 59,87 90,37
73 Ph. Holzmann 82,18 55,42 0,91 6,49 62,82 74,81
94 Strabag 83,02 680 19,15 1,37 27,32 95,24
96 Bergmann 99,12 3689 - 38,89 82,15
98 Hapag-Uoyd 8450 48,15 47,82 0,39 9636 9950
on average 64,49 2199 15,30 9,05 45,44 82,67
l Source: Gottschalk (1988) p. 298. The numbers for Siemens, Veba and Continental
refer to the 1987 meeting. The list adds up the shares of banks
held by them on own account, their proxy hddings and the shares
held by investment companies which are subsidiaries  of the respective  banks.